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1. Attempt at a self-contained quantum description
The consistent-histories program1,2,3 represents a more concerted effort than
previous attempts to overcome what some workers regard as the main defect of the
Copenhagen interpretation: the need to invoke the existence of a classical world as
a pre-condition to the meaningful interpretation of quantum mechanics. Hence, just
as for any other attempt at a self-contained quantum description, the first order of
business for this program is to represent the classical world correctly. It is precisely
on this point, however, that the consistent-histories program has not yet been carried
to completion to the satisfaction of all concerned. It is not the purpose of this note
to discuss the nature of the difficulties encountered; rather, assuming that there
is a quantum description of the quasi-classical world along the lines of consistent-
histories, I ask what the description will be like. In particular, I investigate the
rule of association between the histories in a suitable family and the quasi-classical
worlds that the formalism is supposed to describe.
A family of consistent histories is specified by an initial state ρ(0), the Hamil-
tonian of the world H, and sequences of events. Each sequence is represented by a
chain of Heisenberg-picture projectors:
C(α1α2...αn) ≡ E
α1
1 (t1)E
α2
2 (t2)...E
αn
n (tn) (1),
where the subscript on the projector Eαii refers to the nature of the resolution of the
identity, and the superscript to the specific element within that set of projectors.
The probability P (C) for the occurrence of a history corresponding to the chain C
is:
P (C) = Tr(C+ρ(0)C) (2).
All histories within a family must fulfill certain consistency conditions so that the
probabilities for their being realized satisfy normal additivity rules. The Eq.(1) has
been given in the simplest form which does not take the possible branch-dependence
of projections into account, but I will later return to the issue of branch-dependence
where it might be relevant to the subject of this note.
Consistency alone does not guarantee that the events in a history correspond to
what in the Copenhagen interpretation would be called “actualized” or “registered”
events. In the absence of external observers, it appears that a selection criterion
needs to be added to the consistent-histories formalism to characterize such special
events, which correspond to the ordinary experience that these occurrences actually
happened. It turns out that a mathematical formulation of such a criterion is no easy
task.4,5 But the physical basis that qualifies certain types of events as actualized can
be examined, and is discussed in some detail in the Appendix. Roughly speaking,
the essence of actualization is verifiability from accessible records; and events which
may be regarded as having been actualized or registered will be called “verifiable”
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from here on. A verifiable event is different from a robust event6, the consistency
of which is maintained only by decoherence. Decoherence ensures that the different
alternatives will not later interfere, but does not guarantee that only one of the
alternatives is “actually realized.” It is only when the accessible records in a branch
can corroborate which alternative is realized that one has a verifiable event. A
similar point has been made by Zurek and co-workers within the framework of what
they call “the existential interpretation of quantum mechanics,”7 although it is not
always clear whether they want to make a sharp distinction between a robust event,
where the “record” may consist of little more than scattered photons which escape
to infinity, and a verifiable event supported by accessible records. The main point of
this note is sufficiently simple that the precise mathematical conditions qualifying
an event as verifiable, which have resisted formulation so far, are not needed; but
it is necessary to assume that a selection criterion does exist. The formulation of
a set of clearly stated conditions for distinguishing certain events as verifiable is
absolutely essential for the completion of the consistent-histories program, because
this program tries to describe the classical world with events, and the quantum
events which are directly relevant to the description of occurrences in the observable
world are exclusively verifiable events.
Already in classical physics it is imagined that there exists an underlying fine-
grained structure, the complete details of which can never be checked within the
limitations imposed by the availability of resources. Turning to a quantum descrip-
tion of the world adds the need to consider superpositions with phase correlations,
and subtracts the possibility of certain types of simultaneously precise data, but it is
not greatly different in spirit as far as entertaining the idea of the world as a closed
system is concerned. In particular, among classical statistical physics expositions
there are statements like “the entropy of the world, regarded as a closed system, is
non-decreasing.” The question this article addresses is: What is the nature of the
appropriate coarse-grained quantum state, so as to describe a quasi-classical world
in which entropy increases?
It should be made clear at the outset that the goal here is only to clarify the
nature of the appropriate quantum representation. There is no claim that this quan-
tum description provides any a priori explanation for irreversibility – the common
assumption that the world, under suitable coarse-graining, was in a particularly low
entropy state once, and is still relatively low in entropy today, as the cause for the
validity of the second law in the present era, will again be needed (in the form of an
assumption on the near saturation of records, see section 3). But even with such a
modest goal something can be learned. Because the aim of a self-contained quantum
description of the world is so ambitious, whereas the language of consistent histories
is so very economical – thus far the branching of histories is essentially the only type
of events seriously considered – it turns out that even the mere task of describing
entropy increase requires some modification of that perspective. The modification
consists of the realization that the process of merging two or more histories together
is as relevant to describing the observable world as the opposite process of split-
ting a history into separate branches. As a consequence, the number of possible
quasi-classical branches does not increase indefinitely. In other words, there is no
population explosion of the kind in Everett’s many-world picture.
2. Average entropy is non-increasing under branching
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Although some workers prefer to speak of only histories and not the instan-
taneous density matrix of the world, most researchers, once taking the plunge of
considering a self-contained quantum description of the world as a whole, do not
seem to object to this notion. Since the purpose here is to provide a quantum rep-
resentation of the change in time of the macroscopic world of verifiable facts, it is
appropriate to have an instantaneous density matrix to correspond to the situation
at a specific instant. The consistent-histories formalism suggests a natural density
matrix to consider. The matrix ρ(C, tn) defined by
ρ(C, tn) = C
+(α1...αn)ρ(0)C(α1...αn)/Tr[C
+(α1...αn)ρ(0)C(α1...αn)] (3a)
is a suitable candidate, because it has the property that the conditional probability
for the outcome of the next event to be that particular alternative represented by
E
αn+1
n+1 (tn+1), given the fact that the past history is already specified by C(α1...αn),
equals appropriately Tr[ρ(C, tn)E
αn+1
n+1 (tn+1)]. The density matrix is alternatively
defined by the recursive relation
ρ(C(α1...αn), tn) = E
αn
n (tn)ρ(C(α1...αn−1), tn−1)E
αn
n (tn)/N
where
N ≡ Tr[Eαnn (tn)ρ(C(α1...αn−1), tn−1)] (3b).
The way this density matrix enters the probability for the next event recommends
it as a candidate for a quantum representation for the instantaneous state of the
world, provided ρ(0) is a suitable initial state of the world.
Only three things enter into ρ(C, tn): the initial density matrix, the Hamilto-
nian, and the chain of projections. The Hamiltonian is presumably fixed once and
for all, and so is the initial density matrix. What changes as time progresses is,
in the usual consistent-histories formalism, an indefinite elongation of the chain of
projections. For a verifiable history, the projections are all supported by classical
records, and hence the increase in the information content of the records in the clas-
sical world which ρ(C, tn) is supposed to describe, due to the occurrence of a new
event, is no less than the increase in the information content of ρ(C, tn) itself. The
increase of the information content of classical records can be greater, however, be-
cause for the quantum state some of the initial information may have been destroyed
by the new projection (noncommutivity). One notes that the information content
of classical records is really no different from that of the classical world. Mallarme
famously said:“Everything there is in the world exists to be put in a book,” but the
“book” should be generalized to include all types of classical records.
As to the quantum state, since the choice of an initial state must ultimately
be justified by empirical support, from the position of trying to obtain a quantum
description of the classical world that stays as close to empirical facts as possible,
there is no good reason to treat the initial state and later events by different prin-
ciples. If the later events are factual only by virtue of the records available today,
then the initial state is to be determined by the same criterion: maximum igno-
rance consistent with present data. Indeed, one could let ρ(0) be proportional to
identity, and put in the earliest known information through the first projection at
time t1, and in this way the initial data and subsequent events are treated on the
same footing. Formally, the method of choosing a least-biased state by a variation
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principle subject to constraints is well known, although in practice this will be in-
credibly complicated for the real world. If one wants, however, to have a quantum
description that is as close to the classical world as possible, leaving out no relevant
classical data but also putting in as little extraneous input as possible, then it is
the maximally detailed verifiable histories with the least-biased initial state that are
relevant. In other words, in principle one would like to have every piece of factual
data in the classical world represented in the quantum description: if a classical
datum arises out of deterministic evolution, the information resides in the initial
state and earlier events; and if it arises out of an amplified quantum fluctuation,
then the datum emerges at the point of a new verifiable event. The objective of
the consistent-histories program to have a self-contained quantum description of the
quasi-classical world is not realized unless there is a family of such “least-biased and
maximally detailed verifiable histories.” It will be understood from here on that this
is the kind of history which we are concerned with.
From the consideration of information gain, one might think that for such a
least-biased and maximally detailed verifiable history the change in the von Neu-
mann entropy s[ρ(C, tn)] ≡ −Tr[ρ(C, tn)logρ(C, tn)] due to the occurrence of a new
verifiable event has at least the same sign as the change in the statistical entropy
of the classical world that this history describes. Making this association, however,
gives rise to an immediate difficulty. We state this difficulty as follows:
Proposition
Suppose that (i) there is a faithful quantum description of quasi-classical worlds
by means of a family of least-biased and maximally detailed verifiable histories, which
undergo only branchings, and (ii) the change in the von Neumann entropy of the
density matrix of Eq.(3) due to a verifiable event is in the same direction as the
change in the classical statistical entropy of the world being described. Then on the
average the second law is violated in these worlds.
This proposition follows directly from a theorem of Groenewold and Lindblad.
Groenewold first conjectured8 that under a branching the average entropy of a
branch is equal to or less than that of the parent-state, but a geometrical approach
to proving this conjecture turned out to be difficult. Lindblad9 then gave an elegant
proof drawing on the some previous results.10
Theorem (Groenewold-Lindblad)
If ρ′α ≡ E
αρEα/pα, and pα ≡ Tr(E
αρ),
s[ρ′] ≡
∑
α
pαs[ρ
′
α] ≤ s[ρ] (4).
It is understood here that the set {Eα} consists of orthogonal projectors which
resolve the identity. Since any chain of projections entering into the specification of
a history is built up from projections satisfying the conditions of this theorem, it
follows that, when averaged over the branches of each splitting, the entropy for the
density matrix ρ(C, tn) is non-increasing with n, regardless of what kind of coarse-
graining has been built into the projections. This theorem does not rule out the
possibility that along a particular branch the entropy is non-decreasing, but that
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would be an exceptional situation requiring an explanation, for it goes against the
average trend of Eq.(4), which is for the entropy associated with ρ(C, tn) not to
increase with increasing n.
3. The merging of histories
We have used expressions like “the observable world” and “accessible records”
without being specific on “observable” and “accessible” to whom. This is because
a detailed examination would have involved a lengthy digression, and I decided to
relegate all such matters to an appendix. At this point let it be tentatively sup-
posed that these expressions have sensible meanings. Then the entropy-decreasing
tendency of branching is at least intuitively comprehensible from the information-
gain argument made earlier. This argument suggests that entropy-decrease becomes
unavoidable for a history in which all the events are verifiable. The quoted theorem
says that entropy tends to decrease even when earlier information can be partially
destroyed, but for verifiable events the records keep the earlier information intact,
thus making it even more likely that entropy would decrease with the prolongation
of a history, i.e., with the accumulation of more and more records.
The most natural way out of the quandary created by a tendency for the von
Neumann entropy to decrease under branching is to take into account the fact that
in a world of increasing entropy records do decay. If a branching in the past is still
relevant later because of the persistence of its associated accessible records, then the
decay of records, by their becoming inaccessible as evidence, would partially undo
the effect of that branching. Such partial undoing is what I call “merging.” It is
desirable to incorporate merging without spoiling the simplicity of the consistent-
histories approach. The following proposal for bringing the deterioration of records
into the quantum description of a closed system is guided by two considerations: (a)
the verifiability of a given event is a time-dependent property, since records change
with time; and (b) the decay of the records concerning a past event is not the same as
a quantum erasure. The implication of the first premise is that, unlike a branching
which involves just one time, a merging commonly involves two times: an earlier
moment when the event and its registration occurred, and the later moment when the
records concerning the outcome of that event are obliterated. The implication of the
second premise is that the decay of records does not completely undo a projection.
If one were to represent the decay of the records concerning an event at time ti by
removing the projection Eαii (ti) altogether from the chain C which helps to define
ρ(C, tn), it would be as if no event happened at ti at all; whereas the decay of records
presupposes that an event did occur, and it was even verifiable at one stage, and
the different outcomes were decoherent. When the records decay at time tn and
it is no longer possible to verify the outcome of what actually happened at ti, the
relative likehood of the various alternatives being the best that can be deduced from
the surviving evidence, then these alternatives are to be incoherently summed. In
contrast, removal of the projection at ti would correspond to a quantum erasure, with
the alternative components added back together with exactly the correct phases,
which is imaginable in a laboratory setting but is not realistic for the overwhelming
majority of actual events. The expression “merging of histories” for describing the
incoherent summation seems appropriate because of the following consideration.
The most common pictorial representation for the structure of a family of histories
is that of a branching tree. Although the summation over those branches which the
5
records can no longer distinguish is akin to bundling several branches together rather
than fusing them, the subsequent offshoots undergo a real reduction in number. For
example, a branching into n branches followed by a second splitting each into m
branches would result in a total of nm alternatives; but if the records for the first
branching are later destroyed, the final outcome leaves only m alternatives, and
in that sense the nm branches have merged into the m branches. The situation
described corresponds to a family structure where the projections are not branch-
dependent. If the later projections depend on which branch the event is taking
place in, ther situation becomes more complicated. But the existence of branch-
dependence by itself provides some sort of a record, and therefore in considering
the complete destruction of records, we limit ourselves to situations where branch-
dependence is absent.
The mathematical formulation of merging is relatively straightforward. Thus
the erosion at time tn of the records concerning an event at ti, where tn > ti, is to
be represented by the transformation T :
T : ρ(C(α1...αi...αn−1), tn−1)→ ρ(C¯(α1...α¯i...αn−1), tn) ≡
∑
αi
bα1...αi...αn−1e
−iH(tn−tn−1)ρ(C(α1...αi...αn−1), tn−1)e
iH(tn−tn−1)
where
pα1...αi...αn−1 ≡ Tr[C
+(α1...αi...αn−1)ρ(0)C(α1...αi...αn−1)]
bα1...αi...αn−1 ≡ pα1...αi...αn−1/
∑
α′
i
pα1...α′i...αn−1 (5).
This corresponds to a situation where the last step in the destruction of records
is through the deterministic processes which result from the evolution generated by
exp[−iH(tn − tn−1)]. If, on the contrary, the destruction of records is itself accom-
panied by the actualization of a new quantum event, then one has instead:
T ′ : ρ(C(α1...αi...αn−1), tn−1)→ ρ(C¯(α1...α¯i...αn), tn) ≡
∑
αi
bα1...αi...αnρ(C(α1...αi...αn), tn)
where
pα1...αi...αn ≡ Tr[C
+(α1...αi...αn)ρ(0)C(α1...αi...αn)]
bα1...αi...αn ≡ pα1...αi...αn/
∑
α′
i
pα1...α′i...αn (6).
The proposal is that the instantaneous quantum state suitable for describing
what is happening in the macro-world corresponds to a density matrix of the form
ρ(C¯(α1...α¯i...αn), tn) rather than of the form ρ(C(α1...αi...αn), tn). In other words,
the coarse-graining necessary for describing the observable world cannot be all ef-
fected through the use of suitably coarse projections alone: certain coarse-graining
requires convex summations, as in Eq.(5) and Eq.(6). The resulting change in the
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formalism is very minor, and in particular the transformation corresponding to a
branching is given by:
ρ(C¯(α1...α¯i...αn−1), tn−1)→ E
αn
n (tn)ρ(C¯(α1...α¯i...αn−1), tn−1)E
αn
n (tn)/N
where
N ≡ Tr[Eαnn (tn)ρ(C¯(α1...α¯i...αn−1), tn−1)] (7),
identical in structure to Eq.(3b). It should be noted, however, that the original
chains C(α1...αn) are still relevant because the additional consistency conditions to
be fulfilled with the introduction of any new projection Eαnn (tn) are in terms of the
individual C(α1...αi...αn) and not in terms of a sum over αi.
The processes represented by Eq.(5) are clearly entropy non-decreasing. For the
process of Eq.(6) where tn > ti, or processes where Eqs.(5),(6) and (7) all contribute,
there is competition between the entropy non-decreasing convex summations and the
average entropy non-increasing additional branchings. Without further input it is
not possible to say which tendency wins. If, however, the world’s capability for
carrying records is already near saturation, in the sense that the creation of new
records requires in most cases the destruction of some existing records, then records
are almost continuously being created and destroyed. Over the course of many
such creations and destructions there is a sense in which the entropy-increasing
trend wins. This is because of the fact that the average decrease in entropy due to a
branching event is necessarily less than or equal in magnitude to the average increase
in entropy when subsequently the records corroborating this event are destroyed.
This can be proved as follows. With the notation of Eq.(4), the absolute magni-
tude of the average decrease in entropy as a result of a branching is s[ρ]−
∑
pαs[ρ
′
α],
and the average entropy increase accompanying the destruction of those records
which verify the outcome of the branching is s[
∑
pαρ
′
α]−
∑
pαs[ρ
′
α]. The fact that
the entropy is non-decreasing as a result of these two steps follows trivially since
s[
∑
pαρ
′
α] ≥ s[ρ].
Thus, analogous to the usual assumption that the world is currently in a low-
entropy state, the operative assumption here that can lead to a tendency for entropy
increase is that the present world is already near saturation for record-keeping,
so that records are continuously being generated and destroyed. The degree of
plausibility of this assumption is also discussed in the Appendix.
Bennett and Landauer11,12 have already pointed out that entropy increase is
associated with the erasure of records. Their analysis was in a classical setting,
and therefore they did not address the entropy-decreasing tendency associated with
the branching of quantum histories, nor need they be concerned with the differ-
ence between classical erasure and quantum erasure. Their starting point involving
Maxwell’s demons and computers seemingly has very little in common with our
starting point of formulating consistent histories in order to describe an entropy-
non-decreasing world. Nevertheless their analysis is relevant to our consideration in
two respects. One is Bennett’s demonstration that it makes sense to speak of the
entropy of a single system instead of that of an ensemble – the quantum history
description of the quasi-classical world is most simply viewed as dealing with a sin-
gle system. The second relevant point is their analysis showing that measurement
and copy-making need not be accompanied by an entropy increase. Such reversible
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record-keeping is highly idealized, and most practical record-making is irreversible.
Nonetheless as a matter of principle it is important to recognize that record-making
is not unavoidably entropy-increasing, whereas record-erasing is. Our application
of the average entropy-decrease of Eq.(4) to an amplified quantum fluctuation, i.e.,
to a measurement-like event, should be viewed as referring to a measurement with
ideal record-making. Once the nature of entropy increase is clarified in such ideal
events, then the additional entropy-increase associated with the difference between
ideal record-making and realistic record-making can be accounted for as an accumu-
lation of elementary events, each accompanied by the destruction of some previously
existing records.
There is an alternative possibility for accommodating entropy increase as long
as one is willing to add convex sums to the consistent-histories formalism. Noting the
existence of many physical processes having outcomes that are decoherent but not
verifiable, one may be tempted to adopt the rule that every time such an event occurs
the state representing the quasiclassical world becomes an incoherent sum over these
alternative outcomes. This modification will also bring about an entropy increase.
The defect of this approach is the arbitrariness in the choice of “relevant variables”
which decohere as a result of summing over the “irrelevant” variables, that is, an
arbitrariness in the division between the environment and the subsystem of interest.
If the alternatives involving the subsystem are not accessible to verification, why
are they “relevant” and “of interest”? Remember that one is attempting a closed-
system description here, and there is no pre-determined environment. Our proposal
hews close to what are verifiable, and requires incoherent sums only when there
is a destruction of records, i.e., when formerly verifiable alternatives later become
unverifiable.
Lastly, although I have argued that the dilemma posed by the Proposition is to
be resolved by adding merging to branching, others may wish to avoid the conun-
drum altogether by arguing that the change of von Neumann entropy is unrelated
to that of the classical entropy.13 If one were to look at the entropy changes during
a measurement-like event, whether it occurred in nature or in the laboratory, by the
usual way of reckoning, it would indeed appear that the latter position is obviously
valid. For example, a quantum event having two possible outcomes in a particular
measurement situation can bring about a decrease in the von Neumann entropy of
the density matrix for the quantum system by at most klog2, but the recording of
the outcome is usually associated with irreversible processes, causing a rise in the
classical entropy of the world by an amount far exceeding klog2. Thus the signs are
opposite and the magnitudes do not match. One must remember, however, from the
analysis by Bennett and Landauer that irreversibility is ultimately attributable to
erasure, that is to say, to processes described by Eq.(5) or Eq.(6). Hence the overall
change in the statistical entropy of the world can be accounted for by the change
in the von Neumann entropy of ρ(C¯). In other words, the merging of histories has
to be taken into account. The two changes may not be exactly equal because of
the possibility of the destruction of some quantum information by a new projection,
discussed earlier, but the inequality is such that an increase in classical statistical
entropy requires a corresponding increase in the von Neumann entropy of ρ(C¯) if
the quantum representation is as close to a detailed description of the quasi-classical
world as possible. On the other hand, if one insists on having only branching and
no merging, then the change in the von Neumann entropy of ρ(C) is indeed unre-
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lated to the change in the classical entropy of the world. But to adopt this as the
solution is to unnecessarily impoverish the consistent-histories formalism, rendering
only a very partial quantum description of some aspects of the quasi-classical world.
Such a skeletal description is likely to be insufficient as replacement for the classical
underpinning of the Copenhagen interpretation.
In summary, the tendency for the von Neumann entropy to decrease under
branching, on the average, is a fact to be reckoned with. This is regardless of how
a coarse-grained quantum state is defined: as long as it undergoes only branch-
ings, the average entropy tends to decrease with time. If the second law in the
macro-world is taken as an input, and if a coarse-grained quantum state is to faith-
fully describe that macro-world so that changes of the von Neumann entropy of
the quantum state track those of the classical entropy of the world, then its time
evolution has to incorporate the merging of previously verifiably distinct histories.
If the consistent-histories program is to improve on the Copenhagen interpretation,
it has to provide a faithful description of the quasi-classical world strictly within a
self-contained quantum theory. But that task is not finished even when a specific
family of histories is singled out by some criterion as being suitable for describing
quasi-classical physics, for there must be in addition a rule of association between
the histories in that family and a quasi-classical world with all its macroscopic de-
tails. And our conclusion is that even if at one time a single history in this fixed
family describes that world, it will be the incoherent sum of several histories that
has to be associated with the same world at a later time. Another way of saying
this is that it is inadequate to use projections alone to represent all coarse-graining:
there are events which require incoherent sums, besides coarse projectors, to repre-
sent what is happening to the quantum state. The suggested modifications are easy
to incorporate and does not require any major overhaul of the consistent-histories
formalism; but conceptually the picture of an ever multiplying number of poten-
tial quasi-classical worlds is changed to one where the population of quasi-classical
worlds need not inexorably grow.
(This paper was presented at the E.H. Wichmann Symposium at the University
of California at Berkeley in June 1999.)
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Appendix
This article contains expressions like “observable world,”“information,” “veri-
fiability,” and “accessible records,” which inevitably invite questions: Whose infor-
mation? Observable and verifiable by whom and accessible to whom? How stable
does a physical correlation have to be in order to count as a record? Discussion
of these issues leads to what many physicists would dismiss as “philosophy,” and
yet avoidance of these issues does not save time. As continuing controversies sur-
rounding the subject of quantum measurement14 show, some knotty issues refuse to
go away. Even when the final answers are not available, it is better to state one’s
tentative understanding as clearly and explicitly as possible.
One way to specify the meaning of such expressions is by linking them to oper-
ations. The basic issues as far as this paper is concerned are first of all what kind of
an event can be said to have verifiably occurred, and subsequently when the event
can be said to cease to be verifiable. In an operational sense, an event is verifi-
able if the community of scientists, on the basis of records, is capable of reaching
a consensus on the outcome, provided efforts are devoted to the task of checking
this event, limited only by the availability of natural resources. Similarly the in-
formation content of the observable world is interpreted to be the total database
needed for a complete description of the macroscopic world, including every bit of
datum that is verifiable. This way of describing the relation between records and
the verifiability of an event does not require the records to be unchanging: they can
be evolving in time, because all that is required is for the scientists to be able to
use them to unequivocally interpret an event in the past. By the same token, the
decay of records can take many forms: some due to the corruption of macroscopic
information through classical processes, and some through random events in which
quantum fluctuations play a role. That is why in the sentence following Eq.(5) a
distinction is made between the decay of records through deterministic processes
and through quantum fluctuations. That records can decay even when the process
results from exp[−iH(tn − tn−1)] is not a contradiction, because realistically the
scientific community cannot completely evaluate this operator within the limits of
finite resources, to the precision needed to overcome widespread deterministic chaos.
Note that it is potential verifiability that matters rather than actual verifica-
tion: because rigorous verification is costly in labor and resources, a coarse-grain
description in which every datum is actually verified, rather than just being verifi-
able, would turn out to be very crude indeed. In contrast, a description in terms of
verifiable events can be much finer. The distinction between verified and verifiable
events also helps to answer the following question: With the notion of information
being so closely tied to what the scientific community can verify, how is the in-
crease in scientific knowledge over time to be reconciled with entropy increase? The
answer is that whereas the amount of scientifically verified data is increasing, the
(much greater) amount of scientifically verifiable data is non-increasing when en-
tropy is non-decreasing. But the idea of calling an event “verifiable” provided only
that it can be actually verified when attention is focused on the task of its valida-
tion may seem to lead to a contradiction: the attention of the scientific community
can after all be turned to checking the position of a particle with great accuracy or
the momentum of a particle with great accuracy; hence would not the position and
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momentum be simultaneously verifiable? It must be remembered, however, that
the branching structure of a consistent family is regarded as being first given, and
the verifiability of the events entering a history is being considered in that context.
The consistency conditions exclude histories with events which refer to the position
and the momentum of a particle at the same time. As long as the focus of valida-
tion is directed to one or another of the events already in consistent histories, no
contradiction would arise.
By using potential verifiability rather than actual verification as a selection
criterion, one can envision a relatively refined coarse-grain description of the ob-
servable world. In cosmological terms such a stage was reached probably only after
the recombination era: the entropy non-increasing tendency of branching discussed
in this article becomes relevant only after it is possible for branches to be sharply
distinguished through the existence of records. Initially this tends to bring most
branches towards low entropy states. It is only after a vast number of verifiable
branchings already left a wealth of records, allowing a fairly detailed description of
the macro-world, that new records are mostly made at the expense of erasing old
ones. Even then, if an event has a huge number of redundant records, the erasing of
a few of these will not destroy the credibility of the event; and therefore the hypoth-
esis of “near saturation of record-keeping capacity” presupposes that overall there
are far more nonredundant records than redundant ones. In a refined description
this is not implausible. The most obvious kinds of redundant records occur right
here on earth, but biologically related individual organisms carry a great deal more
data than their shared genetic information, and redundant records made by people
also do not approach anything close to the capacity of refined classical information
that the earth can carry.
One may ask why “scientists” are not replaced by the IGUSes (information
gathering and utilizing systems) of Gell-Mann and Hartle. The answer is that the
greater generality of IGUSes is not particularly helpful in this case: an ant is an
IGUS, and presumably it has some notion of whether some kinds of events happened
or not, but one would be most reluctant to add to the list of verifiable events
something that only ants are aware of with no possibility of independent checks by
human scientists, now or in the future, even when attention is directed to that event.
In other words, even with the introduction of IGUSes, reference to the “community
of scientists” would still be necessary.
With the above explanation of what is meant by “verifiable through records,”
it is finally possible to specify, in principle, when a formerly verifiable event ceases
to be verifiable: a verifiable event at ti may be said to have become unverifiable at
time tn if the records in none of the future extensions from tn onward would permit
the scientists in those branches to corroborate the outcome of this event.
Although a scientific-community-based approach results in a verifiability cri-
terion that is close to the common-sensical notion of “objective reality,” there are
nonetheless some counter-intuitive consequences. By the expression “scientific com-
munity” one usually includes not only today’s scientists but also scientists of the
future, because technology improves with time and defining verifiability as what
current technology can ascertain is too restrictive. Furthermore, there were no sci-
entists in the early stages of cosmological evolution, and yet some of those early
occurrences are regarded as verifiable today, because scientists living considerably
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later than these events can still check them out from the records. Once it is accepted
that future scientists must be included in the notion of a scientific community, one
has to face the awkward fact that there are different future branches. Suppose,
for example, that a continuation of our history into two different future branches,
branch A and branch B, results in different consequences for life. Whereas in branch
A life continues to thrive and instruments continue to improve, in branch B life is
extinguished forever after a cataclysmic event. Then according to the scientific-
community-based criterion, there may be current events which count as verifiable if
our future is in branch A but not verifiable if our future is in branch B. Although
from a pragmatic standpoint this difference is immaterial because present-day sci-
entists cannot check these subtle events in either case, this example shows the value
of an alternative, strictly objective standard that is independent of the existence
of people. For example, one may try to abstract the essence of “verifiability by a
scientific community” into a mathematical criterion for factuality that can be ap-
plied even when life does not exist. This objective has not yet been accomplished,
and it is not obvious that it can be reached at all; although a formulation in terms
of suitable complexity measures, in effect having finite-resource computers filling in
for scientists, appears promising, that approach suffers from the defect that some
of the notions, such as minimal program length, though well defined cannot be op-
erationally checked exactly. There can be heuristic checks, but heuristic standards
are likely to be again evolving with time. As to conceptual rigor, separate from
the question of mathematical rigor, one pitfall that is easy to fall into is to uncon-
sciously slip in some criteria which are reasonable only because of our experience
up to now, and then to regard the result as being more general than it really is.
For example, the environment-induced superselection approach implicitly regards
cuts between environment and system in ways that are based on our usual notion
of what variables are essentially disentangled from the rest of the world, and the de
Broglie-Bohm theory contains arbitrariness in giving spatial positions a privileged
role. These arbitrary inputs all seem very reasonable on the basis of our experience
up to now, but then we cannot yet claim that these theories are totally free from
biases associated with people and their state of advancement.
In a way it is preferable to explicitly acknowledge this possible lack of finality.
The dependence on the existence of a scientific community in the proposed verifia-
bility criterion is similar to the need to refer to normal people for Locke’s secondary
qualities. Locke’s definition is useful only if our standard for normal people is not
going to change significantly in the future. Similarly if the standard of objectivity
achieved by contemporary science is not going to undergo substantial improvements
in whichever future branch our world evolves into, then the proposed criterion will
be useful. Otherwise the utility of this criterion will be limited because of its still
evolving nature.
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